The randomized projective coordinate (RPC) method applied to a pairing computation algorithm is a good solution that provides an efficient countermeasure against side channel attacks. In this study, we investigate measures for increasing the efficiency of the RPC-based countermeasures and construct a method that provides an efficient RPC-based countermeasure against side channel attacks. We then apply our method to the well-known η T pairing algorithm over binary fields and obtain an RPC-based countermeasure for the η T pairing; our method is more efficient than the RPC method applied to the original η T pairing algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pairings on elliptic curves are a well-known subject in the field of cryptography. They have been applied to many cryptographic schemes, such as identity-based encryption [1] , [2] , identity-based signature [3] - [5] , tripartite key agreement [6] , short signature [7] , and identity-based authentication key agreement [8] . Incidentally, pairings on elliptic curves were first introduced as cryptanalytic tools in [9] , [10] .
Since the main difficulty in the efficient implementation of pairing-based cryptographic schemes is the computation of then pairing, many techniques have been developed for pairing computation. Barreto et al. [11] and Galbraith et al. [12] have provided techniques for efficient computations of the pairings by eliminating the unnecessary computation steps from the original Miller's algorithm [13] . Duursma and Lee [14] have found a closed formula of the Tate pairing over a field with a characteristic value of three. Kwon [15] also provided a closed formula over a field with a characteristic value of two. To shorten the main loop of the Tate pairing computation, Barreto et al. [16] have defined the Eta pairing on some supersingular curves. Hess et al. [17] extended this in a more generic manner to the Ate pairing on non-supersingular elliptic curves.
Side channel attacks (SCAs) commonly utilize a relation between side-channel information related to secret data and internal values during cryptographic operations [18] , [19] . There has been some progress in the research on SCAs on pairingcomputation algorithms in the works of Page and Vercauteren H. Kim is a corresponding author of this manuscript, and he is with the Department of Computer Engineering, Pusan National University Busan, Korea, email: howonkim@pusan.ac.kr. [20] , Whelan and Scott [21] , and Kim et al. [22] . In [22] , Kim et al. have investigated the security of the η T pairing over binary fields in the context of SCAs.
A number of countermeasures have already been developed to protect pairing algorithms against SCAs [20] - [23] . In [20] , the bilinearity of pairing is utilized to hide the secret information. Scott [23] has proposed a very simple concept in which the Miller variable m in the BKLS algorithm [11] is multiplied by a random element that will be eliminated in the final exponentiation. In [21] , it is remarked that the random value must be multiplied not only by the Miller variable, but also by all intermediate values that comprise the Miller variable in order to obtain an efficient countermeasure. In [22] , Kim et al. have directly applied the randomized projective coordinate (RPC) method to the original η T pairing algorithm developed by Barreto et al. [16] , and have shown that their countermeasure is the most efficient among all the existing countermeasures.
In this paper, for a given extension field equation, we first perform a measurement to estimate the computation cost of an extension field equation to which the RPC method has been applied. Then, we propose a method for constructing an efficient and secure pairing algorithm from a given pairing algorithm. To demonstrate the application of our method, we present an efficient RPC-based countermeasure of the η T pairing over a binary field, which reduces the additional computation cost by 17% as compared to Kim et al.'s countermeasure in [22] . This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the definitions of the Tate and η T pairings. Section III describes the SCAs and its countermeasures on pairing algorithms. Section IV describes a measurement to estimate the efficiencies of RPC-based countermeasures and proposes a method for the development of an efficient countermeasure against a differential power analysis (DPA) attack; in Section V, we apply our construction method to the well-known η T pairing algorithm over binary fields. The last section presents the conclusions of this study.
II. PAIRINGS ON ELLIPTIC CURVES
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q ; l be a positive integer coprime to q, which divides #E(F q ); and k be the smallest positive integer such that l|(q k − 1) (this is termed the embedding degree). The Tate pairing of order l is defined as follows:
where f l,P is a rational function such that its principal divisor [11] , [13] ;
where aP,bP is a line through points aP and bP (it is a tangent line at aP if a = b), and υ (a+b)P is a vertical line at the point (a + b)P .
Barreto et al. [11] showed that τ l (P, Q) = f l,P (Q)
since l|#E(F q ) and k is the embedding degree. They also proved that for some supersingular curves with embedding degree k = 2, 4, 6 the vertical line evaluation part υ (a+b)P (Q) can be omitted in Miller's algorithm by using a distortion map ψ from E(F q ) to E(F q k ). Their modified Tate pairing is as follows:
It can be directly computed that f N,P (ψ(Q))
where N = hl for some integer h; this computation was first performed by Galbraith et al. [12] . Duursma and Lee [14] and Kwon [15] derived the closed formulas of the Tate pairing for characteristic values of three and two, respectively. Their formulas were deduced by computing f N,P (ψ(Q))
Tate pairing algorithms using these formulas. For the case of a characteristic value of two (resp. three), Kwon [15] (resp. Duursma and Lee [14] ) used the equation N = 2 2m + 1 (resp. N = 3 3m + 1). To shorten the main loop of the pairing algorithm, Barreto et al. [16] defined the η T pairing for some supersingular curves as follows:
, and l L. The bilinearity and non-degeneracy of the η T pairing can be confirmed by the following property (see [16] , [17] for more details):
Hess et al. [17] extended it in a more generic manner to the Ate pairing on non-supersingular elliptic curves.
III. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
SCAs commonly utilize a relation between the side-channel information related to secret data and internal values during cryptographic operations [18] , [19] . An attacker utilizes sidechannel information such as computation timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic radiation for confirming the accuracy of his or her guess about the secret information. The aim of the attack is to guess the secret value (or some related information) stored at the target device. If an attacker is allowed to observe the side-channel information a few times and is able to directly interpret them, it is termed simple power analysis (SPA) . If the attacker can analyze the side-channel information several times using a statistical tool, the process is termed DPA. The standard DPA utilizes a correlation function that can determine whether a specific bit is related to the observed calculation. In particular, if the information about the time taken to execute cryptographic algorithms is utilized, the attack is termed a timing attack (TA). Although SCAs and countermeasures are becoming increasingly well understood, the current emphasis in terms of asymmetric key schemes is mainly on RSA, ECC, and XTR [24] .
Recently, new primitives such as pairing algorithms have investigated. First, Page, and Vercauteren proposed fault and SCAs against the Duursma-Lee algorithm [20] . Very recently, Whelan and Scott investigated practical pairing algorithms such as the Tate, Eta, and Ate pairing using correlation power analysis (CPA) [21] , and Kim et al. investigated the security of the η T pairing over binary fields in the context of SCAs [22] .
A number of countermeasures have been developed to protect pairing algorithms against SCAs [20] - [23] . In [20] , the bilinearity of pairing is utilized to hide the secret information. A pairing is calculated as τ l (P, Q) = τ l (aP, bQ) 1/ab , where a and b are random values, or as
where R is a random point. Note that although the first equation has an additional factor ab in the exponent, it can be eliminated by the careful selection of a and b such that ab ≡ 1 (mod l). Scott proposed a very simple concept in which the Miller variable m in the BKLS algorithm [11] is multiplied by a random element that will be eliminated in the final exponentiation [23] . In [21] , it is remarked that the random value must not only be multiplied by the Miller variable, but also be multiplied by all intermediate values that comprise the Miller variable in order to obtain an efficient countermeasure. Kim et al. introduced efficient and secure algorithms of the η T pairing using RPC systems for computing the pairing [22] .
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT COUNTERMEASURE OF PAIRING ALGORITHM AGAINST DPA ATTACKS

A. Motivation
In [22] , Kim et al. proposed the RPC method as protection against a DPA attack on the η T pairing over the binary field and proved that their method is the fastest method among the existing countermeasures by estimating the computation cost of all proposed methods [20] , [23] . Therefore, the RPC method can be a good starting point for the construction of an efficient and secure pairing algorithm. In the RPC-based countermeasure of the pairing algorithm against a DPA attack, since the inputs of the pairing algorithm are two points P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y) on the elliptic curve, there are three possible methods to randomize a given pairing algorithm:
• The point P is randomized as a projective coordinate (ᾱ,β,γ) = (γα,γβ,γ), whereγ ∈ F * q .
• The point Q is randomized as a projective coordinate (x,ȳ,z) = (zx,zy,z), wherez ∈ F * q .
• Both the points P and Q are randomized simultaneously.
We do not consider the third method because it yields an inefficient algorithm. In order to develop an efficient RPC-based countermeasure against the DPA attack, the following two problems need to be resolved: • Among the above two RPC methods, the method that yields more efficient RPC-based countermeasure must be selected.
• More extensively, a modification of the original pairing algorithm must be found to reduce the computational cost of the RPC-based countermeasure. The drastic increase in the computation cost is mainly caused by the modification of the equation over the extension field in the main loop of the pairing algorithm. Therefore, the equation over the extension field needs to be examined in detail. In the next section, we carefully investigate a special equation over the extension field for four inputs in the base field.
B. RPC Method on Balanced Forms
Suppose that f (α, β; x, y) is a polynomial over a finite field F q for two variable pairs (α, β) and (x, y), and f (α,β) denotes the same polynomial rearranged as an
is called a balanced form over F q if it is represented as follows:
and g i (x, y) are not zeros simultaneously. Furthermore, if f (α,β) and f (x,y) are both balanced forms, then f (α, β; x, y) is said to be a balanced form.
In Definition 1, h i (x, y) and g i (x, y) are called coefficient polynomials, n and e n are called an index and degree of f (α,β) , respectively, and each h i (x, y)α ei or g i (x, y)β ei is called a term of f (α,β) . Note that the index and degree are regarded as zero in the case of f (α,β) = 0 or 1. More explicitly, the index of f (α,β) is defined as follows:
Definition 2: Suppose that f (α, β; x, y) is a balanced form and f (α,β) is represented as shown in (1) . Then, • the index of f (α,β) is defined as n − 1 if the constant term c 0 (x, y) is zero or one, and n otherwise. ,β) ) e , for some integer e , where f (α,β) is also a balanced form. Definition 3: For a given balanced form f (α, β; x, y), an (α, β)-RPC applied formf (α, β; γ) is defined as follows:
Similarly, we can define the notion of an (x, y)-RPC applied formf (x, y; z). From the definitions of the RPC applied form and the index, we can directly obtain the following lemma. Lemma 1: Let f (α, β; x, y) be a balanced form. Suppose that I and e are the index and degree of f (α,β) , respectively, andf (α, β; γ) is an (α, β)-RPC applied form. If α, β, γ, x , and y are regarded as elements in F * q , then I field multiplications are additionally required for the computation off (α, β; γ), compared to the case of f (α,β) when the computations of γ * s are ignored.
Suppose that an extension field F q k over F q is represented by a polynomial basis {1, t, · · ·, t k−1 }. Now, let us consider a polynomial basis F on the extension field F q k such that
where f i (α, β; x, y) is a balanced form over For convenience, we present several definitions and notations as follows:
total index of F , and it is denoted by I (α,β) (resp. I (x,y) ).
degree of F , and it is denoted by e (α,β) . In a similar manner, we define an (x, y)-maximum degree of F , e (x,y) .
• D (α,β) denotes the number of elements of {e i(α,β) |0 = e i(α,β) = e (α,β) for i = 0, · · ·, k − 1}, and the notation of D (x,y) has a similar meaning with respect to x, y.
• C (α,β) (resp. C (x,y) ) denotes the number of field multiplications for efficiently computing
Definition 4: An (α, β)-RPC applied form of F (α,β) , denoted byF (α,β) , is defined as follows:
Similarly, an (x, y)-RPC applied form of F (x,y) , which is denoted byF (x,y) , is defined in the same way. From Lemma 1, we can prove the following theorem for calculating the computation cost of the RPC applied form of F . Theorem 1: Let F be a balanced form over F q k as shown in (2), andF (α,β) be the (α, β)-RPC applied form. Suppose that for each i = j ∈ {0, · · ·, k − 1}, f i(α,β) and f j (α,β) have no identical terms. If α, β, γ, x, and y are regarded as the elements in F * q , then for computingF (α,β) , the required number of field multiplications is as follows:
when the field multiplications for computing γ * s are ignored. 
C. Construction of Efficient RPC-Based Countermeasure
Suppose that F is an equation over the extension field in the main loop of a pairing computation algorithm over a given finite field. Let P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y) be the input points of the pairing algorithm.
Lemma 2: Assume that F is a balanced form over the extension field. Then, the (α, β) (resp. (x, y) )-RPC applied form of F is an equation over the extension field in the main loop of an RPC-based countermeasure randomizing P = (α, β) (resp. Q = (x, y)).
Proof: The proof is essentially based on the idea in [11] , [25] . Since (α, β) is randomized as (α, β, γ) ← (γα, γβ, γ) for γ ∈ F * q , we apply α ← Corollary 1: Let P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y) be the input points of the pairing algorithm and F be an equation in its the main loop. Suppose that F is a balanced form over the extension field as shown in (2), and f i(α,β) and f j (α,β) have no identical terms for each i = j ∈ {0, · · ·, k − 1}. Then,
field multiplications are required for computingF (α,β) when field multiplications for computing γ * s are ignored. Let F be a balanced form that is the extension field equation in the main loop of a given pairing algorithm. Then, from Corollary 1, I (α,β) + D (α,β) + C (α,β) is a good tool to measure the efficiency of the RPC based countermeasure of the algorithm since the main computation cost of the pairing algorithm is caused by the field multiplications for computing F . If we select one randomizing point between two input points P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y), say P , then I (α,β) and D (α,β) values are fixed; however, there might be a chance to reduce C (α,β) because we can modify the coefficient polynomials of f i(α,β) for each i = 0, · · ·, k − 1. Hence, we can propose the following method for constructing an efficient and secure pairing algorithm from a given pairing algorithm:
Construction of an efficient countermeasure against DPA Step 1. Determine which method is more efficient between the RPC methods using the points P and Q, respectively, by investigating the ( , )-total index, D ( , ) value, and C ( , ) value of the F in the main loop of the algorithm by Corollary 1.
Step 2. Assume that the method using the point P is selected in the first step. Then, modify each f i(α,β) for i = 0, · · ·, k − 1 to reduce the value C (α,β) if possible.
Step 3. Apply RPC method randomizing the point P on this modified algorithm
In the above construction, if we obtain a new modified pairing algorithm from the given pairing algorithm in steps 1 and 2, the modified algorithm can be called an RPC-friendly pairing algorithm, because the modified algorithm yields an efficient RPCbased countermeasure against DPA attacks. The practical application and examples of our construction method are examined in the next section.
V. APPLICATION TO EXISTING PAIRING ALGORITHMS
A. Efficiency of RPC Methods Randomizing Two Input Points Respectively
In this section, we give two examples of the efficiency of RPC-based countermeasures. First, we apply the RPC method to the η T pairing algorithm [16] on supersingular curves with characteristic two; second, we apply the RPC method to the Tate pairing algorithm [14] with characteristic three.
Algorithm 1 describes Barreto et al.'s η T pairing algorithm over binary fields [16] (for details of the closed formula, see Appendix).
Algorithm 1 η T pairing algorithm on the curve E
where b ∈ {0, 1} and m odd [1] .
The term i in steps 2 and 5 of Algorithm 1 is defined as follows (it is also defined in (9) of the Appendix):
In [22] , Kim et al. randomized the input point Q after a comparison of efficiencies between RPC based countermeasures using input points P and Q, respectively. Now, we can easily examine the efficiency of the RPC methods randomizing P and Q, respectively, by investigating I (α,β) + D (α,β) + C (α,β) and
The extension field F in step 5 of Algorithm 1 can be accurately described as follows:
F :=f 0 + f 1 s + t, where
Example 1: From (3), (α, β) , and
w(α, β) = α + (m + 1) 2 and (5)
Then, the (α, β) (resp. (x, y))-total index of F is 4 (resp. Since base-field squaring is relatively inexpensive [26] and the method in [27] for computing square roots is as fast as squaring, the field multiplication cost is sufficient to compare the efficiencies of the two RPC methods. Hence, the RPC method using the point Q is more efficient than the method using P .
Example 2: In Duursma-Lee's Tate pairing algorithm over fields using characteristic three [14] , [15] , the equation in the main loop is as follows:
for given input points P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y). Then, the indices of f 0(α,β) and f 2(α,β) (resp. f 0(x,y) and f 2(x,y) ) are both 1 y) ) is repeated at f 2(α,β) (resp. f 2(x,y) ), we can reduce the number of field multiplications by one for computing F (α,β) (resp. F (x,y) ). Therefore, F (x,y) ). Hence, the RPC methods implemented by using the point P and Q have the same field multiplication cost when the cubing and the cubic root computations are ignored. However, since the cubic root computation is generally more expensive than the cubing computation, we can conclude that the RPC method using the point P is more efficient than the method using Q.
B. RPC-Friendly η T Pairing Algorithm over Binary Fields
In this section, we develop an RPC-friendly algorithm for the η T pairing over binary fields using steps 1 and 2 of our construction method.
• Since the RPC-method using the point Q = (x, y) is more efficient than the method using the point P , as shown by Example 1, we first rearrange (3) in the main loop of Algorithm 1 with the (x, y)-variable as observed in (4)-(6).
• Second, we modify the coefficient polynomial c(α, β) in (6) as follows:
where w(α, β) is defined as in (5). Consequently, the modified polynomial c(α, β) does not require any field multiplication. Therefore, C (x,y) is reduced by one. More explicitly (7) shows that
) (for details of the notations, see the Appendix). Algorithm 2 RPC-friendly algorithm of η T pairing on the curve
where b ∈ {0, 1} and m odd. Input: P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y). Output: η T (P, ψ(Q)).
: end if 10: end for
Our new RPC-friendly η T pairing algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 reduces the computational cost by two square root computations on the base field F q , compared with the Algorithm 1 (i.e., Barreto et al.'s algorithm). Therefore, the reduction due to this modification is only a negligible amount of the total computation cost of the η T pairing. That is, the field multiplication costs of the Algorithms 1 and 2 are the same. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the RPC-based countermeasure, this small modification causes a significant difference.
In Algorithm 2, the (x, y)-total index of the equation in the main loop is 2, D (x,y) = 0, and C (x,y) = 1. Therefore, I (x,y) + D (x,y) + C (x,y) = 3 field multiplications are required for computing the equation in the main loop of the RPC-based countermeasure in Algorithm 2 by Corollary 1. However, four field multiplications are required for computing the equation in the main loop of the RPC method (i.e., Kim et al.'s algorithm [22] ) in the original Algorithm 1 (i.e., Barreto et al.'s algorithm [16] ) (see Example 1) .
Algorithm 3 describes the RPC based countermeasure applied to our RPC-friendly algorithm. The total field multiplication cost of Algorithm 3 is 6(m +1)M +5M since the total cost of Kim et al. algorithm is 6.5(m + 1)M + 5M [22] , where M denotes one base field multiplication cost.
Since the total cost of Barreto et al. algorithm and our RPCfriendly algorithm is 3. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we have performed a measurement of the pairing computing algorithm in order to estimate the efficiency of an RPC-based countermeasure against SCAs. We have been able to construct a method to yield an efficient countermeasure of the pairing algorithm against SCAs. Using this method, we have presented an RPC-friendly η T pairing algorithm over binary fields from the original Barreto et al.'s algorithm. The proposed RPC-friendly η T pairing algorithm reduces the computation cost by two square root computations and has only a slight advantage in efficiency. However, if we apply the RPC method to this algorithm as protection against DPA attacks, then this countermeasure reduces the additional computation cost by 17%, compared with that in the case of application of the RPC method [22] to Barreto et al.' s algorithm, which is the most efficient existing countermeasure. This implies that a small modification of the original algorithm might have a significant effect on the efficiency of DPA countermeasures.
